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Abstract 
Prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA) is now a proven method for the identification of chemical 
warfare agents and explosives in military projectiles and storage containers.  Idaho National Laboratory is 
developing a next-generation PGNAA instrument based on the new Ortec Detective mechanically-cooled HPGe 
detector and a neutron generator.  In this paper we review PGNAA analysis of suspect chemical warfare munitions, 
and we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of replacing the californium-252 radioisotopic neutron source with 
a compact accelerator neutron generator. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Figure 1:  Identification markings of a French World War I-era mustard gas 75-mm artillery 
projectile.[1]
1.1. The "non-stockpile" munitions identification problem 
Worldwide, armies tend to identify artillery and mortar projectiles in their stockpiles by color 
codes, code letters, and symbols, as depicted in Figure 1.  However military firing ranges, old 
battlefields, and munition disposal sites may contain hundreds to thousands of unexploded 
projectiles, and over time these “old and abandoned” or “non-stockpile” projectiles lose their 
identifying markings due to corrosion, as shown in Figure 2.  Yet the safe and lawful disposal of 
non-stockpile munitions requires identification of their fill chemicals, and besides explosives, 
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these commonly include smoke-generating substances such as titanium tetrachloride and white 
phosphorus.  In addition, in countries where chemical warfare (CW) agents have been stored, 
tested, or used in battle, the list of non-stockpile munition fill chemicals expands to include 
blister agents, choking agents, nerve gases, and other CW agents.  Finally, many armies train 
with practice munitions, and practice munition fills include sand, concrete, water/antifreeze 
mixtures, and plaster-of-Paris. 
Figure 2: A 4.7-inch artillery projectile during assessment in the Spring Valley neighborhood of 
Washington, D.C., January 1993.  PGNAA determined this “non-stockpile” projectile contains 
an incendiary chemical.  The projectile was likely buried in 1919.
1.2. A Prompt Gamma-ray Neutron Activation Analysis solution 
The prompt gamma-ray neutron activation analysis (PGNAA) technique employs neutron 
radiation as a probe of an item's fill.  Neutrons can easily penetrate the steel casing of a bomb or 
artillery shell, and they excite the atomic nuclei of the chemicals inside.  In turn, these nuclei de-
excite by emission of high-energy gamma rays.  These gamma rays also penetrate steel to escape 
the container or munition, and hence their characteristic gamma-ray signature or "spectrum" can 
be measured with a gamma-ray detector external to the item under test.   
As a nondestructive method for both treaty monitoring and the identification of non-stockpile 
chemical munitions, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (now Idaho National Laboratory, or 
INL for short) developed the Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS) chemical assay 
system in 1991.[2,3]  PINS is the first PGNAA system designed for identification of chemical 
warfare agents.  Since 1992, PINS instruments have been employed to identify thousands of 
suspect chemical non-stockpile munitions in worldwide, and it has been calibrated on most types 
of military explosives and every type of chemical munition in the current U.S. stockpile.[4]   
Since 1995, PINS has been a commercial product of the Ortec Division of Ametek, Inc.[5]   
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The first two generations of PINS instruments use a californium-252 radioisotopic neutron 
source and a liquid nitrogen-cooled HPGe gamma-ray spectrometer.  We consider it essential to 
use a high resolution germanium spectroscopy system to separate the fill chemical signal from 
the significant background from the munition body.  In the case of a 155-mm artillery projectile 
filled with sarin (GB) nerve agent, the fill chemical mass is 3 kg, while the projectile mass is 
over ten times greater, 41 kg. 
1.3 Neutron generator-based PGNAA instruments for munition fill identification  
Recently INL began design of the next generation PINS system, and to simplify logistics for 
military customers, it will use a modified version of Ortec’s Detective mechanically-cooled 
HPGe detector to eliminate the need for liquid nitrogen cooling.  The Detective contains a digital 
signal processing MCA and sufficient battery power for three hours operation in a compact 10 kg 
package, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Ortec Detective mechanically-cooled HPGe detector.
The next generation PINS system will use an electrical neutron generator in lieu of the 
californium-252 source.  INL has evaluated neutron generators from Activation Technology 
Corp., the All-Russia Institute of Automatics (VNIIA), EADS/SODERN, and Thermo Electron 
over the past several years; a test of the SODERN Genie-16 neutron generator with an actual 
chemical warfare munition is shown in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: A SODERN neutron generator irradiates a mustard-agent filled 4.2-inch mortar 
projectile during a test assay at U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, September 2003.  For 
safety, the mortar projectile is overpacked inside the air-tight olive-drab steel can stenciled 
“LEAKER.”
Previously, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory tested a neutron generator-based PGNAA 
system for chemical warfare agent identification in 1992,[6] and more recently, Brüker and 
SAIC have produced commercial PGNAA instruments for explosive and CW agent 
identification that employ neutron generators.[7,8] 
2.  PGNAA FOR CW AGENTS AND EXPLOSIVES 
2.1 Response of atomic nuclei to neutrons 
Nuclear techniques like PGNAA are not sensitive to molecular bonds, and at best they can 
provide an unknown chemical’s stoichiometric elemental ratios.  However, given the limited 
number of chemical types found in munitions, information on which elements are present and 
which are absent is often sufficient to accurately infer the identity of the fill chemical.   
When the stable, naturally occurring chemicals inside a munition are irradiated with neutrons, 
their nuclei are promoted to excited states by neutron capture and neutron inelastic scattering 
reactions.  As these nuclei de-excite, they emit characteristic gamma rays, and by measurement 
and analysis of the resulting gamma-ray spectrum, one can identify the chemical elements 
present inside the item under test, since the energies and relative intensities of their characteristic 
gamma rays have been measured and cataloged for all of the naturally occurring elements in the 
periodic table.[9]
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2.2 The elemental composition of chemical warfare agents, explosives, and military smoke 
chemicals 
Many chemical warfare agents are hydrocarbons, as shown in Table 1.  The nerve agents GA, 
GB, GD, and VX are organophosphorus compounds.  Agent VX can be distinguished from the G 
series of nerve agents by the presence of sulfur.  The blister agents mustard and lewisite contain 
no phosphorus, but both contain about 45-50 weight-% chlorine, and lewisite can be 
distinguished from mustard agent by the absence of sulfur and the presence of arsenic.











Hydrogen 7.1 8.8 6.8 9.7 5.0 1.0 
Carbon 34.3 46.2 37.0 49.4 30.2 11.4 
Oxygen 22.9 17.6 19.8 12.0   
Nitrogen  17.3 5.2    
Fluorine 13.6 10.4     
Phosphorus 22.1 17.0 19.1 11.6   
Sulfur    12.0 20.1  
Chlorine     44.7 51.3 
Arsenic      36.1 
The one or two letter codes, e.g. GB, are the NATO designations for these agents. 
Most explosives contain a few weight-% hydrogen, about 20-40 weight-% nitrogen, 
approximately 40-60 weight-% oxygen, and a balance of carbon, as illustrated in Table 2. 
Table 2:  Elemental composition in weight-% of common military explosives.[11]  
Comp. B HMX PETN RDX Tetryl TNT 
Hydrogen 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.7 1.7 2.2 
Carbon 24.5 16.2 19.0 16.2 29.0 37.0 
Oxygen 42.8 43.2 60.8 43.2 44.6 42.3 
Nitrogen 30.4 37.8 17.7 37.8 24.4 18.5 
Fluorine       
Phosphorus       
Sulfur       
Chlorine       
Arsenic       
Military obscuring smokes include titanium tetrachloride, FM smoke; FS smoke, a mixture of 
chlorosulfonic acid and sulfur trioxide; HC smoke, a mixture of aluminum, hexachloroethane, 
and zinc oxide; and white phosphorus (WP) smoke.  The elemental make-up of these smokes is 
displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3:  Elemental composition in weight-% of military obscuring smokes.[12,13]
FM FS HC WP   
Hydrogen  0.4     
Carbon   4.7    
Oxygen  51.5 9.2    
Aluminum   6.7    
Titanium 25.3      
Phosphorus    100.0   
Sulfur  34.4     
Chlorine 74.7 13.7 41.9    
Zinc   37.5    
2.3 Fill identification decision tree 
From the information in Tables 1 through 3, one may construct a simple decision tree to identify 
munition fills based on PGNAA results.  The decision tree used in PINS systems is shown in  
Figure 5.  The decision-tree logic of Figure 5 is readily implemented as a computer program.  
The PINS system analyzes 8,192-channel gamma-ray spectra and executes the decision tree 
algorithm every ten seconds during data acquisition, presenting assay results in real time to the 
system operator.   
Figure 5:  PINS decision tree logic 
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3.  NEUTRON GENERATOR VS. Cf-252 EXCITATION FOR PGNAA 
Californium-252 is a relatively long-lived and reliable source of neutrons which is widely used in 
a number of industrial PGNAA systems.  It has a half-life of 2.645 years, allowing for an easy 
estimate of source intensity versus time, and decays via alpha emission (96.91% probability) and 
spontaneous fission (3.09% probability) with a specific neutron emission rate of 2.314 x 106 n s-1
Pg-1.[14]   For over 15 years 252Cf has served as a reliable and effective neutron source for PINS 
PGNAA chemical assay field work.[2,3]  However, as explained above, there are some 
compelling reasons to consider using compact accelerator neutron generators in place of 
californium-252 including the higher neutron emission intensity and harder neutron spectrum of 
these devices as well as their ability to be turned-off when not in use.  A brief comparison of 
some of the important differences between these two neutron sources is presented in
Table 4 (for a descriptive example of compact accelerator neutron generator technology, see 
references 15 and 16). 
Table 4: Comparison of Cf-252 and DT neutron generator parameters 
Parameter 252Cf (10 Pg) Neutron Generator 
Neutron Yield, n/s 0.23 x 108 2 x 108
Neutron Spectrum Watt Fission Spectrum 14.1 ± 0.1 MeV 
Pulsing Range, Hz Continuous only Continuous up to 20,000 
Power Consumption, W 0 50 
Mass, kg 0.01 12 
General Size, cm 0.01 x  0.01 16 x 60 x 30 
2 mrem/hr stand-off distance, m 3.5 13.8 
3.1.  Advantages:  logistics, safety, higher output, background issues 
In terms of system performance, using higher energy neutrons from a DT source allows for the 
excitation of higher energy nuclear inelastic scattering reactions which are non-existent or very 
weak when interrogating using fission spectrum neutrons.  Analysis using these inelastic 
reactions can help to improve precision and speed in the analytical determination of some CW 
agents and in identifying non-CW fill materials including high explosive identification based 
upon oxygen analysis.  Beyond the important differences in acquired PGNAA spectra between 
fission neutron and fusion neutron irradiated objects there are several practical advantages to 
using sealed-tube neutron generators in the field in comparison with using radioisotope sources.  
Most obvious is the ability to turn these sources off when they are not needed.  By turning the 
neutron generator off, or into a stand-by mode where no neutrons are emitted, personnel can 
easily work around the generator to place test objects and equipment without being exposed to 
neutron radiation.  Also, the off-state of these devices helps to reduce logistical complexities 
associated with the shipment of radionuclides since external radiation shielding, such as is used 
when shipping 252Cf, is not needed.  While special shipping and receiving processes must still be 
employed due to the tritium content of DT neutron generators, shipping these devices is 
significantly less complicated then for 252Cf sources.  As a reference it is worth noting that most 
compact accelerator neutron generators contain between 2 – 4 Ci of tritium; in comparison, 
industrial tritiated exit signs used in hotels and shopping centers, for example, can contain up to 
20 Ci of tritium. 
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Other advantages when using neutron generators are their higher neutron yield (10x) in 
comparison to standard 10 Pg 252Cf sources, their pulsing ability and their lack of associated 
gamma-rays such as occur through spontaneous fission.  Modern neutron generators are capable 
of up to several thousand hours of continuous, reliable operation.  Gradual erosion of the metal 
hydride targets in these devices eventually leads to a decrease in neutron output to approximately 
20% that of a new instrument under the same operating conditions. After this point is reached, 
however, they are then capable of further sustained output at this reduced yield level, which is 
still comparable to that of a new 10 Pg 252Cf source.  The ability to pulse these devices allows for 
the possibility of separating data collection into two regimes, with the generator on and with the 
generator off, which under some circumstances can prove useful for improving the signal-to-
noise ratio of PGNAA spectra.  This can be a useful technique for dealing with interference 
reactions from the CW container.  The lack of associated gamma-rays in fusion neutron 
generation can also be beneficial in reducing the intensity of collected PGNAA spectra under 
some circumstances. 
3.2.  Disadvantages:  detector shielding problem, background issues 
Some noteworthy disadvantages when using a neutron generator in comparison with 252Cf are the 
instrument’s size, complexity, and power requirements.  Although today’s neutron generators are 
much smaller and easier to use than comparable generators of ten years ago, they are still much 
larger and heavier then radioisotopes (although not that much larger or heavier then 252Cf when 
its 20 kg radiation shielding/shipping container is also considered).  In the standard PINS set-up 
a small polyethylene neutron reflector/moderator assembly is used to help boost the intensity of 
thermal neutrons in the test object measurement location.  When using a neutron generator may 
be of equal or greater importance to use an external assembly to attempt to boost the thermal 
neutron intensity within the test object, depending upon the nature of the test object and it’s fill 
material.  Unfortunately, the larger outer diameter of neutron generators in comparison with 
252Cf sources means that external moderator assemblies are larger and heavier then with the 
standard PINS set-up.  While some tricks may be used in the design of these reflectors/ 
moderators they are usually require several kilograms of material.[17]  The complex nature of 
modern neutron generators often requires the use of a control computer.  Fortunately, this is not 
usually a great disadvantage since a computer is normally present to control PGNAA data 
acquisition and analysis. Also, when used in remote locations, a battery-operated power supply 
may be required, further increasing PGNAA system size and weight. 
Some additional disadvantages when using a neutron generator are the need for more extensive 
shadow shields in comparison with 252Cf and the generation of spectral interferences in the 
PGNAA analysis from (n,n’), (n,2n), and (n,p) reactions in the vicinity of the measurement.  For 
the standard PINS set-up with 252Cf a layered shadow shield of roughly 10 cm of tungsten and 1 
cm of Bi is used to protect the sensitive HPGe detector from fission neutrons and photons.
Neutron attenuation in the shadow shield is especially important in order to avoid fast neutron 
damage in the germanium crystal.  For a high yield DT neutron generator the dimensions of this 
shadow shield are significantly increased, requiring perhaps as much as 20-30 cm of tungsten 
and/or other high Z materials to ensure the fast neutron flux in the crystal is below neutron 
damage thresholds and below levels that introduce significant dead-time in the PGNAA 
  9 
measurement.  In addition to necessitating a thicker shadow shield, the high energy DT fusion 
neutrons also interact in nearby structural and background materials through more reaction 
channels then fission neutrons.[18] Additional gamma-ray photons from fast neutron interactions 
in the test object and other nearby materials, such as the detector stand, add more complexity to 
the PGNAA spectrum.  Fortunately, with the use of a high resolution HPGe detector, these 
additional background photons can usually be distinguished from CW agent signatures in the 
PGNAA spectra.  
3.3.  Neutron generator reliability concerns 
Radioisotope sources are the epitome of reliability, which is one reason why they are so often 
used in industrial applications requiring continuous analytical data acquisition.  For PINS CW 
agent analysis, however, 24 hours-a-day, 365 days-a-year steady state operation in not needed.
Typical PINS analysis for a suspect chemical artillery round, for example, is performed in 3,000 
seconds or less, depending upon the nature of the test object and the type of fill.  Up to ten or 
twelve munitions may be assayed over the course of a typical twelve-hour working day.  In the 
past commercial neutron generators were typically capable of operating for only a few hundred 
hours (a period which often varied by a few hundred hours for identical products from the same 
vendor), after which catastrophic failure within the neutron tube of these devices resulted in an 
end state in which it was impossible to achieve further operation.  Because of these relatively 
short lifetimes, and the inability to accurately predict when this catastrophic failure would occur, 
many users were often left with broken instruments and unplanned work stoppages as they
waited for replacement of the neutron tube.  During long test campaigns or in other time critical 
situation this unknown risk of system failure posed a significant drawback for introduction of 
neutron generators into industrial settings.  In some cases users would preventively change-out 
the neutron tube every 100-200 hours in order to avoid encountering catastrophic failure in the 
field.  Either waiting for instrument repair or using preventative change-out, the solution was 
expensive and unacceptable for field operations expected to go for more then a few weeks of 
daily use between field service intervals. 
Over the past 10 years; however, significant advances have been made in the design of sealed 
neutron tubes used within neutron generators, reaching a point where catastrophic failure is rare 
and the primary “failure” mechanism is a slow degradation in neutron output over time which.  
In some cases the generator’s neutron output level drops to a level at which the neutron tube 
must be replaced in order to meet particular goals for data acquisition time or sensitivity but in 
some cases the original generator neutron output exceeds the applications requirements with 
sufficient margin such that even degraded output is acceptable.  Another aspect of system 
reliability for industrial applications is start-up time.  For modern neutron generators typical 
transition times from a stand-by state to full output operation are 30-45 seconds, compared with 
waiting periods of up to 10 minutes in older systems.  Even with significant target erosion and 
loss of neutron yield it is likely that a neutron generator used in a PINS system should be able to 
be used reliably for several years before neutron tube replacement is needed. 
Beyond the reliability of modern neutron generators in terms of neutron output, there are valid 
concerns regarding the ruggedness of these devices and their suitability for field use.  Despite 
careful design considerations such as the qualification of Thermo Electron’s MP320 neutron 
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generator as a certified pressure vessel (to allow shipment with pressurized sulfur hexafluoride 
(SF6) insulating gas in the neutron generator), modern commercial neutron generators are 
sensitive electronic instruments and must be handled carefully. Their design is far from being 
capable of meeting typical MILSPEC performance specification for shock and vibration, for 
example, and their associated control electronics enclosures do not typically meet higher level 
environmental protection criteria such as the NEMA 4 standard.  Despite these limitations it is 
still probable that modern commercial neutron generators will prove satisfactorily rugged for 
typical PINS field work.  As a reference it is worth noting that HPGe detectors used in PINS 
systems, which are probably more sensitive to environmental insults then neutron generators, are 
routinely and successfully used by field technicians and military personnel around the world 
under extreme conditions of temperature, humidity, and blowing sand. 
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